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Polysemy and word meaning: an account of lexical meaning for different kinds of 
content words 
Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of lexical words, i.e., words that 
contribute with content to the meaning of sentences. This debate has coincided with a 
renewal in the study of polysemy, which has taken place in the psycholinguistics camp 
mainly. There is already a fruitful interbreeding between two lines of research: the 
theoretical study of lexical word meaning, on the one hand, and the models of polysemy 
psycholinguists present, on the other. In this paper I aim at deepening on this ongoing 
interbreeding, examine what is said about polysemy, particularly in the 
psycholinguistics literature, and then show how what we seem to know about the 
representation and storage of polysemous senses affects the models that we have about 
lexical word meaning. 
Introduction 
There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of lexical words, which, as a first 
approximation, can be characterized as words that contribute with content to the 
meaning of sentences. The distinction between functional and lexical words is 
notoriously difficult to make, but we can take it that, typically, lexical words are used to 
describe and categorize the world, whereas the role of functional words is more 
structural and language-internal. For the most part, linguistics has tended to treat lexical 
words in general terms only. However, this is not true anymore, as semanticists, 
pragmaticians, as well as psycholinguists have been paying more and more attention to 
the role that lexical words play in the construction of propositional meanings. 
It has been observed that lexical words do not always contribute with the same 
conceptual meaning to propositional constructions. In some cases, this is because the 
word is overtly context sensitive. For instance, an adjective such as tall will express a 
different conceptual meaning when the standard of tallness is placed at one point of the 
scale of height than when it is placed at another point. But in many other cases, words 
are not overtly context sensitive, and yet they fail to express the same conceptual 
meaning in all occasions. For instance, the word mouth can denote the whole mouth, its 
outside part, a part of its inside part, its whole inside part, an aperture (such as in the 
mouth of the cave), the part of the river that opens into an ocean (river mouth), a whole 
person (I have two mouths to feed), a person who speaks too much (big mouth), etc.  
The study of lexical word meaning has coincided with a renewal in the study of 
polysemy, which has taken place in the psycholinguistics camp mainly. There is already 
a fruitful interbreeding between two lines of research: the theoretical study of lexical 
word meaning and the models of polysemy psycholinguists present. In this paper, I 
deepen on this ongoing interbreeding, examine what is said about polysemy in the 
psycholinguistics literature, and then show how what we seem to know about the 
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representation and storage of polysemous senses affects the models we have about 
lexical word meaning.   
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 1, I describe three models of lexical word 
meaning, which are echoed by three similar models of polysemy representation. In 
Section 2, I distinguish different kinds of polysemy. Then, Section 3 shows that none of 
the models from Section 1 can fully account for the phenomena distinguished in Section 
2, and consequently argues against monolithic accounts of word meaning and polysemy 
representation. Section 4 examines the possibility that different classes of lexical words 
have different types of meanings, and deals with a problem that arises in connection 
with what has been discussed in the preceding sections.  
1. Models of polysemy and models of lexical word meaning 
Word Meaning 
It is possible to distinguish three models of lexical word meaning, i.e. of what kind of 
meaning lexical words have. It is customary to differentiate between the standing 
meaning of a word and its occurrent meaning. The standing meaning of a word is the 
meaning the word has as a type, whereas the notion of occurrent meaning applies to 
particular tokens of that word-type. In the case of indexical terms, the standing meaning 
is taken to be the rule of application or character, while the occurrent meaning is the 
reference or denotation of a particular use of the indexical. In the case of lexical words, 
the distinction makes sense only if it is assumed that word-types have a meaning, over 
and above what they express in the context of an utterance. Meaning-eliminativists deny 
that word-types have any meaning at all. However, most authors take it that word-types 
have some kind of meaning, and that it thus makes sense to speak about the standing 
meaning of a lexical word. The main three general proposals are: 
A. Literalism: each word-type has a literal, denotational, meaning. The rest of meanings 
it can have relates to linguistic rules, coercion, or pragmatic factors.  
B. Underspecification (thin) account: the standing meaning of a word is underspecified 
with respect to its occurrent meaning. 
C. Overspecification (rich) account: the occurrent meaning of a word is just a part (or a 
selection) of the total standing meaning of the word.  
Here, labels can be misleading. Literalism follows the assumption that, among the 
various conceptual meanings a word can take, there is a privileged one, the rest being 
derivations of it. However, literalism can come in various guises, and the border 
between literalism and overspecification is not clear-cut. For instance, an 
overspecification approach such as the one defended in Zwarts (2004) and Hogeweg 
(2012), where the default meaning of a word is its most informational one, could count 
as literalist. Zwarts (2004), for instance, holds that the meaning of round includes the 
features COMPLETENESS, CONSTANCY, INVERSION, ORTHOGONALITY, and DETOUR. 
Round can express notions that have less features, i.e., that are thinner, but these are 
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departures from the meaning of the word-type that, presumably, are obtained by 
suppressing some of the features that constitute the meaning of round. Also, an account 
of the meaning of polysemous nouns such as book that states that book has the meaning 
TEXT•TOME (more on this below), can be counted as literalist, since it can be said that 
TEXT•TOME is the literal meaning of book, and that the aspect TEXT (as in I enjoyed the 
book) and the aspect TOME (as in the book is heavy) are occurrent meanings derived 
from book’s literal meaning. In order to distinguish literalism from overspecification, I 
will understand literalism as committed to the further hypothesis that the alleged non-
literal meanings are not obtained by a process of selection (in other words, the rest of 
the meanings are strictly derivations from the literal meaning).   
An example of the literalist approaches that I have in mind is “classical” Relevance 
Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1985/96, 1998). According to this version of Relevance 
Theory, lexical words encode atomic concepts, although they rarely express them. 
Rather, words typically express ad hoc concepts, which are computed on the basis of 
the encyclopedic information associated with the concept that the word encodes as well 
as contextual factors. Thus, the word flat encodes the concept FLAT, but expresses the 
ad hoc concept FLAT* in the Tour de France this year is mainly flat. A very different 
literalist view could explain the variations in the concept that a word expresses in terms 
of coercion (see Asher, 2015 on flat)1. Coercion is essentially a mechanism by which 
hearers repair a type mismatch in the process of composition. A prototypical example of 
coercion is an utterance of 
(1) Mary began the book. 
Begin is an aspectual verb that requires an event as an argument. However, we find a 
non-eventive NP in its place. The idea then is that the hearer repairs this mismatch by 
coercing the NP into the eventive argument that the verb requires, obtaining the 
interpretation “Mary began reading the book”. If we want to appeal to coercion in order 
to explain all variations in the concept that a word expresses, we need to assume that 
words have a literal meaning that undergoes coercion. For instance, if we want to 
explain that bottle in I drank the whole bottle refers to the content of the bottle as a 
result of coercion, we need to assume that the word-type bottle literally refers to the 
container.  
The underspecification hypothesis about word meaning states that the standing meaning 
of a word is underspecified vis a vis its various occurrent meanings. The standing 
meaning is more abstract and general than the concepts we express when we use the 
word. Defenders of this view hold that the semantic values corresponding to word-types 
may have the “wrong format” (Recanati, 2004, Carston, 2012) to produce propositional 
contents. This, in most cases, amounts to saying either that there is a proprietary 
                                                          
1 The more general view of Asher (2011) is more accurately classified as a mixed account: it is a literalist 
account for coercions and meaning shifts, but an over-specification (dot-object-ist) account as far as 
`inherent polysemy' is concerned. Note, incidentally, that the different theoretical approaches discussed 
here were developed to handle different phenomena, not necessarily as general approaches to lexical 
semantics.   
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semantic ontology, i.e. that there is a distinctive realm of meanings, a realm apart from 
the realm of contents, or that lexical word meanings, although conceptual in nature, are 
too schematic to enter into propositional contents.  
Underspecification approaches are lately gaining in popularity. Chomsky’s writings 
against truth-conditional, denotational, semantics have been clearly influential in this 
respect (e.g., Chomsky, 2000, Yalcin, 2014, Pietroski, forth.). However, Chomsky has 
not been the sole influence by any means. The contextualist movement in pragmatics 
has had a profound impact as well. For instance, Charles Travis’ influential attack on 
truth-conditional semantics has many points in common with Chomsky’s, both in terms 
of the kind of problematic examples he uses and in terms of the general lesson he seems 
to draw from these examples (Travis, 2008). Carston’s (2002) and Recanati’s (2004) 
brand of contextualism, on the other hand, has targeted the idea that lexical word 
meanings could be concepts (i.e. mental particulars) and that sentences could encode 
truth-evaluable compositions of concepts (i.e., psychologically real thoughts). However, 
underspecification hypotheses can be found elsewhere, both in work dating from the 
late eighties (Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992) as well as in recent work in Cognitive 
Linguistics (Evans, 2009). Common to all of these different views is the idea that 
occurrent meanings of lexical words are always enrichments of their standing, 
schematic meanings. 
The overspecification (rich) hypothesis is characterized by the tenet that occurrent 
conceptual meanings of words are selections, or parts, of their standing meanings. That 
is, the standing meaning of a word is taken to be a rich conceptual structure that 
typically exceeds what is being expressed when we use the word in a context. 
Overspecification accounts can be divided in two kinds. Overspecification holds that 
what is expressed by a word-token is a part, or a subset, of the conceptual meaning of 
the word. Now, this part can be proper or improper. If the part is proper, it follows that 
the occurrent meaning of a certain word will never be identical to its standing meaning. 
If the part is improper, then some uses of the word may express its standing meaning. 
This is the version of the rich meanings hypothesis that can be regarded as a version of 
literalism (see above). Both the “dot objects” account of polysemous terms such as book 
and Zwart’s (2004) and Hogeweg’s (2012) application of Optimality Theory to lexical 
semantics are exemplifications of this version of the rich meanings hypothesis. 
The “dot objects” account of some polysemous terms traces back to Pustejovsky (1995). 
There, Pustejovsky proposed to explain a particular kind of polysemy, labeled ‘inherent 
polysemy’ (see below), by resorting to a new kind of type, which would be the result of 
merging two different types into a compound. Thus, the type of lunch in lunch was 
delicious but took forever is said to be the type event•food. The components of the 
compound are called ‘aspects.’  
However, Pustejovsky (1995) famously introduced another kind of version of the rich 
meaning/overspecification hypothesis (see also Moravcsik, 1975). In order to explain 
how coercion and other kinds of co-composition effects take place, he postulated that 
5 
 
some words have informationally rich lexical entries that take the form of a qualia 
structure. According to Pustejovsky (1995), lexical meaning involves a structure 
consisting of four levels of representation: ‘argument structure’, ‘event structure’, 
‘qualia structure’, and ‘lexical inheritance structure.’ The qualia structure of a lexical 
item (usually exemplified by nouns) is the hallmark of Pustejosky’s theory and includes 
information about how the object came into being (agentive role), what kind of object it 
is (formal role), what it is for (telic role), and what it is constituted or made of 
(constitutive role). In some accounts inspired by the Pustejovskyan proposal, qualia 
structures are thought to provide ‘aspects’ or ‘facets’ (that is, different ways of seeing a 
given entity)2, which are also the senses that enter into truth-conditional compositions 
(Cruse, 2004; Frisson, 2009; Paradis, 2004), an idea reminiscent of Langacker’s (1984) 
notion of ‘active zones.’ This liberal reading of Pustejovsky’s qualia structures 
exemplifies the “proper parts” version of rich meanings, since words never express a 
complete qualia structure, but only a part of it. 
As will be seen, many psycholinguists believe that the semantics of a word-type can be 
a structure that offers different possibilities of meaning. This, again, is a proper parts 
version of the overspecification hypothesis. Rayo’s (2013) proposal that word-types 
give access to a “grab bag” constituted by exemplars, prototypes, theories, and other 
structures, is yet another possible exemplification of this version of the hypothesis, as is 
Vicente and Martínez Manrique’s (2016) view that words give access to a rich 
conceptual structure. 
Polysemy 
The three views about word meaning outlined above, correspond to three similar 
accounts on polysemy, in particular, on how polysemy is represented and stored. 
Polysemy is the well-known observation that a word has various different but related 
meanings. In this, it is contrasted with monosemy, on the one hand, and homonymy, on 
the other. While a monosemous form has only one meaning, a homonymous form is 
associated with two or several unrelated meanings (e.g., coach; ‘bus’, ‘sports 
instructor’), and is standardly viewed as involving different lexemes (e.g., COACH1, 
COACH2).  
There is a growing interest in polysemy, especially in the psycholinguistics camp, 
which focuses on differences in access, storage and representation of polysemous senses 
vis a vis homomymous meanings (the different related meanings of polysemous 
expressions are standardly called ‘senses’: Frisson, 2009). However, polysemy is also 
studied from different perspectives, such as computational linguistics (Pustejovsky, 
1995, Copestake and Briscoe, 1995, Asher, 2011), pragmatics (Falkum, 2011), 
psychology (Srinivasan and Rabagliatti, 2015), cognitive linguistics (Brugman, 1988, 
Evans, 2015), theoretical semantics (Jackendoff, 1992), and lexicography (Kilgarriff, 
1992, Hank, 2013). As said above, it is possible to group the different views that have 
                                                          
2 Note that this is a liberal use of Pustejovsky’s technical notion of aspect, which can give rise to 
occasional misunderstandings.  
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been defended concerning how senses are represented and stored into three main 
theories: 
A’. Literalism: each polysemous term has a literal, denotational, meaning. The rest of 
senses it has are generated on the basis of linguistic rules, coercion, or pragmatic 
inferences.  
B’. Underspecification (core meaning) account: the meaning of a polysemous term is an 
underspecified, abstract, and summary representation that encompasses and gives access 
to its different senses. 
C’. Overspecification (rich) account: the meaning of a polysemous term includes all its 
different senses, which are stored in a single representation. Senses are selections of the 
total meaning of the word. 
I will understand literalism with respect to polysemy in the same way as above: 
basically, a position that can also be described as an instance of overspecification does 
not count as literalist. Literalism is partly endorsed by Asher (2011, 2015), where, as 
mentioned, he tries to explain a good number of meaning variations in terms of 
coercion, as well as by representatives of Relevance Theory such as Falkum (2011, 
2015), and Copestake and Briscoe’s account of some regular polysemies (1992) (see 
Falkum and Vicente, 2015, for a review).  
Recent psycholinguistics tends to favor underspecification and overspecification 
approaches. What distinguishes one from the other is the question of whether access to 
the different senses of a word is direct or goes through an intermediate station called 
“common core” (Klepousniotou, et al. 2008; see also Brocher et al., 2016). The 
common core of, e.g. the different senses of the verb cut could be “change of state in 
which an entity which exemplifies some kind of connectedness undergoes a process of 
controlled disconnection” (Spalek, 2015). Whenever a reader finds the word cut in a 
text, she activates that common core representation. It may be that she is not required to 
home in on a more specific sense, and thus this is the only representation that is 
accessed, even if more specific interpretations are also activated (Frisson, 2009). 
However, the reader may need to home in on a specific sense of the word. In this case, 
she would easily retrieve the specific sense from the constellation of senses the 
underspecific representation gives access to.  
In this respect, polysemy resolution differs from homonymy resolution, where (a) 
readers need to home in on a specific meaning as soon as they encounter the homonym, 
(b) there is a clear bias towards the dominant meaning, and (c) different meanings 
compete against each other, so that the meaning that is not selected quickly decays. 
According to Frisson (2009, 2015), Klepousniotou et al. (2012), MacGregor et al. 
(2015), and others, in polysemy resolution we do not see a strong bias for the most 
frequent, or dominant, sense. Indeed, senses prime each other no matter which sense is 
more frequent, and their common activation survives for at least 750 ms (MacGregor et 
al., 2015). These observations, together with the further observation that words with 
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multiple senses are recognized faster (in lexical decision tasks) than words with less 
senses and, especially, than homonyms (Azuma and van Orden, 1997), suggests that the 
representation and storage of polysemous senses is very different from the 
representation and storage of homonym meanings (see also similar results concerning 
production reported in Li and Slevc, 2016). As it is customary to think that 
homonymous meanings are stored in different lexical representations, the model of 
polysemy representation and storage has to be different from the sense enumeration 
lexicon some advocated in the past (Katz, 1972)3.   
Psycholinguists, however, cannot decide which one of the two possible competitors 
(underspecification and overspecification) best fits their data. Thus, Frisson (2009; 122) 
states: 
“At the moment, it seems impossible to distinguish between all these different views on 
the basis of experimental results. However, what all these views seem to have in 
common, whether one considers the lexical representation to be semantically rich or not 
… is the idea that what is initially accessed is not a full-fledged, specific interpretation 
of a word”. 
 
Similarly, MacGregor et al. (2015; 137) hold: 
“The current results do not directly address the nature of polysemous representations, 
but they are compatible with the possibility that polysemes exist as a basic or common, 
core representation, which could be seen as underspecified… An alternative to an 
underspecified polysemous representation is one that is semantically rich comprising all 
relevant information associated with a particular word form. Over time as more 
meanings are acquired the representation becomes richer”. 
However, the underspecification and the overspecification approaches are theoretically 
very different. The former, but not the latter, is committed to there being a summary 
representation or common core that encompasses all the different senses, a 
representation that a reader/hearer can retrieve if she is not particularly pressed to go for 
a more specific sense. As will be seen below, not all kinds of polysemy fit within a 
model with this commitment on board. 
As mentioned above, the most influential overspecification approach to polysemy is 
Pustejovsky’s (1995). The account based on the notion of “dot objet” seems to be able 
to explain a great number of facts concerning “inherent” polysemy (see below), while 
the liberal reading of his qualia theory accounts for other kinds of sense alternations 
(Cruse, 2004, Paradis, 2004, Vicente, 2012, 2015), where different aspects, or facets, of 
the total conceptual meaning of the word are differentially highlighted. 
                                                          
3 Not all psycholinguists are convinced. Some authors (e.g., Klein and Murphy, 2001, Foraker and 
Murphy, 2012) advocate a SEL model. However, there seems to be emerging a consensus according to 
which the SEL model could be a good model only for distantly related senses (e.g. shredded paper vs 
liberal paper). 
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In what follows, I will assume that a theory of word meaning needs to be able to 
account for polysemy, that is, that a good account of word meaning is also a good 
account of polysemy. If we have a theory of word meaning that cannot explain some 
facts about the phenomenon we call polysemy, then there is something wrong with that 
theory. The next two sections are devoted to explaining that none of the accounts of 
polysemy (A’-C’) listed above can explain the whole range of observations we currently 
know about polysemy, the implication being that none of the accounts of word meaning 
(A-C) are good (unrestricted) theories of word meaning. I will argue that, prima facie, 
we should adopt a “mongrel” view according to which different classes of words have 
different kinds of meanings (rich vs. thin). Then, in Section 4, I will raise a problem for 
this account. 
 
2. Interesting kinds of polysemy 
In this section, I will present some “facts” about polysemy concerning processing, 
representation and storage, as well as concerning linguistic tests like co-predication and 
anaphoric binding. These facts will be presented and discussed in relation to a proto-
taxonomy of polysemy patterns. Most research on polysemy has either focused on just 
one kind of polysemy or failed short of distinguishing one kind from another. However, 
it is important to differentiate kinds in the study of polysemy because, as it will be seen, 
differences are substantial and revealing. The taxonomy I offer is motivated by the 
concerns about word meaning that motivate this paper. I think that, with these concerns 
in mind, it is possible to distinguish three broad kinds of polysemy: inherent or logical 
polysemy, merely regular polysemy, and metaphor-based polysemy.  
Inherent or logical polysemy 
The label ‘inherent polysemy’ was introduced by Pustejovsky (1995) to refer to a 
special kind of regular polysemy. Apresjan (1974: 16) described the polysemy of a 
word A in a given language with the meanings ai and aj as being regular if “there exists 
at least one other word B with the meanings bi and bj, which are semantically 
distinguished from each other in exactly the same way as ai and aj (…).” The 
characteristic feature of inherent polysemy, according to Pustejovsky, is that the 
different senses of the word in question are of contradictory types. For instance, book in 
(3a) is of the type info while in (3b) it is of the type physobj. The type of lunch in (4a) 
is food, and in (4b) it is event (Pustejovsky, 2005): 
(3a) Mary has written an excellent book. 
(3b) John sold his books to Mary. 
(4a) I have my lunch in the backpack.  
(4b) Lunch was really long today. 
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Pustejovsky (1995) postulates the existence of a special complex type, dot-object, to 
account for inherent polysemy. Thus, book is not of the type info or physobj, but of the 
type info•physobj. The types info and physobj are the types of the aspects that 
constitute the dot object (which can be described as TEXT and TOME, Cruse, 2004). 
Aspects can be highlighted differentially, as in (3a, b) and (4a, b), respectively. But a 
peculiarity of dot objects is that they pass co-predication and anaphoric binding tests. 
Thus, in (5) the book is said to have simultaneously a property that only informational 
objects can have and a property that only physical objects can have. A similar thing, 
mutatis mutandis, occurs in (6) with respect to lunch. 
(5) That heavy book is real fun. 
(6) Lunch was delicious but took forever. 
Asher (2011) calls ‘logical polysemy’ regular polysemy that passes co-predication and 
anaphoric binding tests, and postulates a “dot-objectual” meaning whenever a word 
exhibits “logical polysemy.” While co-predication tests are not completely reliable 
(Dölling, forth), they seem to reveal that we can successfully refer to a whole dot-
object, or, putting it in other words, that we can think of entities that belong to different, 
complementary kinds, as coherent, individual, entities. At the same time, we can also 
conceptualize these entities as involving two different entities, their aspects. Thus, one 
may think of a book as a physical object (tome) only, as an informational object (text) 
only, or as both at the same time. In principle, there is no limitation as to the number of 
aspects that constitute a dot object. In (7), for instance, Brazil refers to a land, an 
institution, and a people: 
(7)  Brazil is a large two-century-old Portuguese-speaking country (Arapinis and Vieu, 
2015) 
Frisson (2015) presents a study of how we process what he calls “book” polysemies 
(e.g., book, manuscript, notice, journal, etc.), with results that can be plausibly extended 
to at least all kinds of inherent polysemies. The study consists in two experiments: a 
sensicality task and an eye-movement experiment. In the sensicality task, subjects were 
presented with a prime NP in which the adjective focused on either the tome (e.g., 
bound book) or the text (e.g., scary book) sense. Then, they were asked to make a 
sensicality judgement about a target NP in which the adjective focused on either the 
consistent (e.g., [well-plotted book], scary BOOK), or the inconsistent (e.g., [bound 
book], scary BOOK] sense. The results showed a clear consistency effect, with 
increased processing times in the inconsistent condition compared to the consistent 
condition, but no effect of either sense dominance or direction of sense switch (tome to 
text or text to tome) in the inconsistent condition. In the subsequent eye movement 
study, there were three conditions: The neutral conditions aimed at testing how quickly 
a specific sense is assigned to a polysemous word without prior contextual indication. 
The repeat conditions aimed at testing the effect of sense repetition on ease of 
processing. Finally, the switch conditions tested whether switching from one sense to a 
competing sense involves extra processing costs.  
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In the neutral conditions, subjects did not have more difficulty disambiguating towards 
the subordinate than the dominant sense of the polysemous noun. In the repeat 
conditions, subjects spent more time reading the polysemous noun than in the neutral 
condition, but the time to select a particular sense was not affected by sense frequency. 
In the switch conditions, processing was more difficult than in the neutral context, and 
switching from a subordinate to a dominant sense induced greater costs than vice versa. 
These results suggest that “book” polysemies are processed very differently from both 
homonyms and other kinds of polysemies where senses are related but distant (Klein 
and Murphy, 2001, Foraker and Murphy, 2012). They also strongly suggest that the 
different senses of inherent polysemous expressions are stored together with a single 
representation (vis a vis homonymous meanings, stored in different representations). As 
will be seen, this kind of results is not specific to inherent polysemies. Thus, inherent 
polysemies can be said to conform a linguistic kind but not a psycholinguistic kind. 
Merely regular polysemy 
In a good number of regular patterns of polysemy we see a close, metonymic, 
relationship between the different senses of a certain word. However, they are not cases 
of inherent polysemy, since, although they can occasionally pass the co-predication test 
(depending on the pattern), it seems that it makes little sense to account for them in 
terms of dot-objects (Pustejovsky, 2005). Firstly, we have a strong intuition that one of 
the senses is derived from the other, in particular by means of metonymy. Secondly, and 
more important, it does not look like the two senses refer to entities which can be seen 
as being fused into a single whole. Instances of this kind of merely regular polysemy are 
patterns such as animal/meat/fur (8a, b, c), count/mass (9 a, b), tree/wood (10a, b), or 
liquid/portion of liquid (11a, b). 
(8a) That rabbit is fast,  
(8b) We have rabbit for lunch,  
(8c) He is wearing a rabbit coat. 
 
(9a) He ate an apple,  
(9b) There was apple all over the floor. 
 
(10a) This region is full of oaks,  
(10b) Oak is more expensive, but also more elegant. 
 
(11a) She doesn’t drink alcohol, not even beer,  
(11b) She is having a beer. 
 
It is not clear, however, whether a polysemy pattern exemplifies inherent or merely 
regular polysemy. Though the senses in (12a-f) are related in a part-whole relation, it is 
not obvious that they do not form a dot object, or at least, that they cannot be regarded 
aspects of a total meaning of mouth that would include them all: 
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(12a) Open your mouth (cavity) 
(12b) He has a beautiful mouth (lips) 
(12c) You cannot live without a mouth (whole thing, abstract) 
(12d) Put that into your mouth (inside) 
(12e) I have a pain not in my teeth, but in my mouth (palate) 
(12f) Wonderful words came out of her mouth (speech organ). 
Copestake and Briscoe (1995) propose to account for cases like (8-11) by means of 
rules such as universal grinder (which takes the meaning of a count noun and gives the 
meaning –substance- of a mass noun), or meat grinder (which goes from the animal 
sense to the food sense). Frisson and Frazier (2005) found some evidence for this 
account, although Klepousniotou et al. (2008) found that in the rabbit case each sense 
(animal and meat) primes the other, and that there are no dominance or frequency 
effects. Their study was also a sensicality task involving neutral, conflicting, and 
consistent contexts (see above). It turned out that, while for homonyms and “distant” 
polysemes there was between-meaning competition, in the rabbit cases, just like for 
book cases, it rather looked like both senses were stored together.  
Pustejovsky (2005) recommends explaining the polysemies in (8-11) in terms of rules, 
and the container/content alternation in (13a ,b) as “explotation of the telic role”: 
(13a) Who is carrying the bottle? 
(13b) I drank the whole bottle. 
 
So it is possible that these regular polysemies are special, and even that some instances 
are better treated in terms of a “one representation” approach, while others involve 
going from one sense to the other either by means of a rule or by pragmatic inference 
(Falkum, forth.). 
Apart from these typical instances of regular polysemies, there are other cases that have 
been scarcely studied, but that could be included in the present group. For instance, 
Machery and Seppälä (2011) present a number of statements, such as Tina Turner is a 
grandmother, where subjects tend to respond “in a sense, yes/ in a sense, no”, and argue 
that grandmother is polysemous between a definition and a prototype sense. In a related 
study, Knobe et al. (2013), used words like scientist or friend to show that there are two 
different rules of application related to two different senses of these words. If asked 
whether some non-academic who is very inquisitive and methodical is a scientist, 
subjects also tend to respond “in a sense, yes/ in a sense, no”. It seems that some words 
fall under regular patterns of sense alternation which could be described as 
definition/prototype (Machery and Seppälä, 2011), and concrete features/abstract ideal 
(Knobe et al., 2013). 
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Irregular polysemy based on metaphorical extensions 
Metonymy is one of the major polysemy-generating mechanisms. The other major 
mechanism is metaphor. Whereas metonymy-based (either inherent or merely regular) 
polysemy affects mainly nouns, proper or common (as can be seen by looking at the 
above examples), metaphor-based polysemy affects all kinds of words, from nouns and 
prepositions to adjectives and verbs. Metaphor-based polysemy is typically irregular (in 
the Apresjan’s sense) and rather idiosyncratic. The relationship between the different 
senses is one of similarity, and similarity is in a good part up to the eye of the beholder.  
Whereas metonymy-based polysemies has attracted great attention from computational 
and formal semanticists, metaphor-based polysemy has been the focus of a good 
number of studies within the Cognitive Linguistics tradition, starting with Lakoff (1987) 
and Brugmann’s (1988) work on the polysemy of over. The hypothesis that many 
cognitive linguists defend is that metaphor-based polysemies are structured in terms of 
meaning-chains which stem from a prototypical, usually embodied, meaning of a word, 
and extend in various ways. Brugmann listed as many as one hundred different senses 
of over.  
This kind of polysemy does not pass co-predication or other tests, like conjunction 
reduction. Rather, concatenation of senses typically creates zeugma (Zwicky and 
Sadock, 1975), as in: 
(14) Arthur and his driving license expired yesterday. 
Some cognitive linguists seem to endorse a sense enumeration model concerning the 
storage of this kind of polysemy (Brugman, 1988), but recent psycholinguistic studies 
question this view. For instance, MacGregor et al. (2015) tested the polysemy of mouth 
as in mouth of a person, mouth of a river and mouth of a cave, and observed the same 
overall pattern of co-priming and facilitation effects observed in regular polysemy. 
While there are some differences between the two cases (regular vs metaphor-based 
polysemies) with respect to the speed of response in a lexical decision task 
(Keplousniotou and Baun, 2007), and, in general, in the time it takes for one sense to 
activate another (MacGregor et al., 2015), both cases seem to pattern together when the 
contrast class is homonymy. In particular, within 750 ms after prime offset, an 
incoherent meaning of a homonymous word has decayed, whereas an incoherent sense 
of a polysemous word is still activated. MacGregor et al. (2015; 138) therefore conclude 
that, also in the case of metaphor-based polysemies, “sustained activation of both 
meanings of polysemous words supports an account of representation in which the 
multiple senses are stored together” and that “the different senses act collaboratively to 
strengthen the representation, which facilitates the maintenance even after a long 
delay”. 
Where they waver is about the way to interpret their results (see above): 
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“The current results do not directly address the nature of polysemous representations, 
but they are compatible with the possibility that polysemes exist as a basic or common, 
core representation, which could be seen as underspecified… An alternative to an 
underspecified polysemous representation is one that is semantically rich comprising all 
relevant information associated with a particular word form. Over time as more 
meanings are acquired the representation becomes richer”. 
3. Where the models fail 
The aim of this section is to show that none of the models of polysemy representation 
(A’-C’) presented above can account for all the three cases of polysemy distinguished in 
the previous section. 
 Inherent polysemy cannot be accounted for by (A’) and (B’) 
Literalism (A’) implies that there is some kind of hierarchy in the world of senses. One 
of them is the meaning of a word, and the rest is derived. In the case of metaphor-based 
polysemies, it is prima facie reasonable to assume that, e.g., the human organ meaning 
of mouth is its literal meaning, with the other senses being derived from it. However, 
there seems to be no reason to assume that the text (or the tome) sense of book is its 
literal meaning. Even if one sense is more frequent than the other (it seems that the text 
sense of book is more frequent than its tome sense, see Frisson, 2015), given that each 
activates the other on a regular basis, it is not credible to say that the most frequent 
sense is the literal meaning. Besides, the literalist hypothesis lacks an explanation as to 
why inherent polysemy allows for co-predication. There seems to be something really 
special about this kind of polysemy. What is it, according to a literalist? 
The underspecification, thin, approach (2’) does not have any account as to why these 
polysemous terms pass co-predication tests either. The theory states that the meaning of 
a polysemous term is some abstract or summary representation that encompasses the 
different senses the word has. This theory is intended to apply to all sorts of polysemy, 
or at least to the sorts of polysemy we have considered here. The question is why 
inherent polysemy, but not the others, pass co-predication tests. This is still to be 
explained. 
However, the really damaging problem for the underspecification approach is that there 
is no summary or abstract representation that encompasses all the senses of an inherent 
polysemous expression. Klepousniotou et al. (2008: 1535) describe a core meaning as 
“a memory structure encompassing all semantic features that are common across 
multiple senses of a polysemous word (e.g., for the word ‘rabbit’, a core representation 
might include [+ANIMATE, +FARM ANIMAL, +EDIBLE, +MEAT].” However, as Foraker 
and Murphy (2012) reply, it is not the case that rabbit retains the four features described 
above in the sentences I saw a rabbit running and I am cooking rabbit. In the case of a 
running rabbit, the rabbit is not edible, and it is not meat. In the case of rabbit meat, the 
rabbit is not animate. In general, polysemous senses that belong to a regular pattern of 
polysemy do not share features that could build a core meaning, a summary 
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representation, or an underspecific representation that covers all of them. In the 
particular case of inherent polysemies, there seems to be nothing in common between 
book-the-text and the book-the-tome, between Brazil-the-people, Brazil-the-institution, 
and Brazil-the-land, or between school-the-institution, school-the-process (School starts 
at 9), school-the-building, and school-the people (I have to talk to the school). The only 
representation that encompasses all of the different uses of book, Brazil, and school is 
one that lists them all. 
The overspecification, or rich, hypothesis then emerges as the only plausible contender 
with respect to inherent polysemy. A model such as the dot-object approach seems to be 
able to explain co-predication (in fact, it was “designed” to do that). On the other hand, 
as we have seen, psycholinguists only seem to consider two hypotheses: an 
underspecific and an overspecific approach. In this case, the choice is clear. We have to 
hold that the polysemy of, e.g. school can only be explained if the meaning of school is 
a whole formed by aspects that can be selectively activated.  
Merely regular polysemy is problematic for (B’) 
The case against literalism with respect to merely regular polysemy is not as clear as in 
the case of inherent polysemy. Whereas we lack intuitions about which of the two 
senses of book should be considered its literal meaning, we have intuitions about which 
sense of oak (tree or wood) or apple (count or mass) is the literal meaning of each of 
these words. Actually, rule-based approaches (Copestake and Briscoe, 1995) are aimed 
precisely at this kind of polysemies. And pragmatic (Falkum, 2010, forth.) and coercion 
(Asher, 2011, 2015) proposals have also been advanced. Finally, as noted above, the 
empirical results are not clear-cut. So, perhaps literalism is an option with respect to 
some cases (e.g., most instances falling under the mass-count alternation) and 
overspecification the best explanation of other cases (container-content and rabbit 
cases). The option that seems to be ruled out is underspecification, because, as has been 
mentioned before, there is no common core that encompasses the different senses of a 
merely regular polyseme. 
Overspecification fails at (C’) 
The psycholinguistic evidence related to the lack of frequency effects and to co-priming 
constitutes evidence against literalism and sense enumeration, but, as it has been 
stressed, it does not distinguish between the under- and the over-specification 
hypotheses, according to psycholinguists. In the cases of merely regular and inherent 
polysemy we have appealed to the lack of a summary, abstract, representation that could 
cover the different senses in order to argue for an overspecification model. However, 
metaphor-based polysemies are very different from metonymy-based polysemies in this 
respect. Metonymic senses are closely related, but they, arguably, do not share (many) 
features. However, metaphors are based on similarity, which can be explained in terms 
of feature-sharing (cf. Brocher, et al., 2016). 
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In metaphor-based polysemies there is also an intuitive pull towards a literalist 
hypothesis. After all, metaphors are constructed on the basis of a literal meaning. 
However, the question is whether, once metaphorical meanings have been constructed 
and conventionalized, we need to calculate them on the basis of these literal meanings. 
Metaphor-based polysemy has not been as thoroughly studied as metonymy-based 
polysemy, but, from what we know so far, we might conclude that there is no 
literal/metaphorical distinction at the level of processing, i.e. that there is not a 
representation of the literal meaning that we access first in order to find or construe a 
metaphorical sense (at least when that sense is conventionalized, i.e. when we are 
dealing with actual polysemes). 
It is also noteworthy that, whereas metonymy generates a limited number of senses, 
metaphor is able to create hundreds of them (Brugman, 1988). Besides, it is difficult to 
decide how many senses there really are. For instance, cut surely has lots of senses 
(Elman, 2009), but it is not clear whether in cut the grass and cut the cake, cut expresses 
different senses, something that does not seem to happen in metonymy-based polysemy. 
Another difference between these two kinds of polysemy worth mentioning is that it is 
simply impossible to call the senses of a metaphor-based polyseme, aspects. The mouth 
of a river and the mouth of a cave are not aspects of a mouth. They are related to aspects 
of mouths, as bigmouth, mouth of Sauron, and mouth to mouth, are expressions related 
to aspects of mouths. Yet, they do not denote such aspects. 
If we leave literalism at one side and we face the recurrent choice between the under- 
and the over-specification models, this time we need to side with underspecification. 
Two reasons seem to be strong enough. First, in metaphor-based polysemy there can be 
a summary or abstract representation that applies to all the different senses (Brocher et 
al., 2016). Second, the number of senses is way too large to believe in a representation 
formed by all of them. The most plausible hypothesis in this case is that the summary, 
abstract, or core meaning representation plausibly consists of a number of features that 
form part of all the metaphorical senses. The activation of these features spreads to all 
the senses that include such features, which explains co-priming. The more features are 
shared, the more activation they receive. 
If we move the focus to verbs, we can see that the underspecification hypothesis is 
actually quite convincing. Let me begin with the relative unboundedness nature of verb 
senses. If it is conceded that the senses in play in cut the grass and cut the cake are 
different (though clearly related), then it seems that the senses of cut can extend without 
any obvious limitation. This, of course, is not to say that cut can be made to mean 
anything whatsoever. The point is just that there seems to be no principled list of 
possible senses of cut. A plausible reason for this behavior of verbs is that the different 
senses of a verb relate to the internal arguments they take. It is now well-attested that 
alleged semantic features of verbs such as aspectuality (whether they denote states, 
activities, accomplishments, or achievements) and the possibility of certain argument 
alternations, are rather features of whole VPs (for aspectuality, Dowty, 1979; for 
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argument alternations, Rappaport Hovav, 2014). It should not be surprising that what 
we take to be verb meanings are, actually, dependent on whole VPs.  
For instance, depending on the internal argument it takes, cut may have different 
grammatical behavior. Thus, cut typically enters into the conative alternation (John cut 
the rope/ John cut at the rope), but not always: the bank cut at its interest rates does not 
sound correct (Falkum, 2011)4. Thus, it seems that the different senses of verbs are 
generated or retrieved (depending on the level of conventionalization) in composition, 
and in particular, that they partly depend on the internal argument verbs they take (see 
Spalek, 2015, for a development). The lexical meaning of cut can be very abstract, so 
that it covers both uses of cut in cut the grass and cut the interest rates. Spalek (2015), 
for instance, proposes that the lexical meaning of the Spanish verb cortar (roughly, but 
not exactly, equivalent to cut)5 encodes a change of state in which an entity which 
exemplifies some kind of connectedness undergoes a process of controlled 
disconnection6. This kind of abstract meaning could be the common core present in all 
uses of cortar, both in its more “literal” and in the more figurative uses (like cortar la 
circulación/stop the traffic). This common core would give access to more specific 
senses, which express what it means to cut a given entity or kind of entity.  
Regardless of the story that is put forward about how we go from the underspecific 
meaning to specific senses (either via on-line co-composition or by directly accessing 
stored specific senses), it seems that the underspecification model fares much better 
than the overspecification account when it comes to explaining verb meaning variations. 
As such variations are typically similarity-based, it makes sense to consider that 
metaphor-based polysemies in general fit the underspecification approach better. 
 
4. Classes of words: different types of meanings 
It is tempting to think that different classes of words have different kinds of meaning. In 
particular, it seems that nouns that denote kinds or individuals have rich meanings, 
while most other nominals, as well as most verbs, prepositions, adverbs, and adjectives 
have thin meanings. If we use the polysemy “facts” to build our account of word 
meaning, this is the picture that seems to emerge. These facts show that only some 
nominals (mostly, kind terms and proper names) enter into regular patterns of 
polysemy, which is the one that suggests a rich meanings view.  
The idea that prototypical nouns have a differentially richer meaning can be supported 
by other considerations. One such consideration appeals to the semantic behavior of 
                                                          
4 Another example: ‘break’ typically admits the anticausative alternation (‘Jonh broke the window’/’the 
window broke’), but not always: ‘John broke the law’ is ok., but ‘the law broke’ is not (see Spalek, 2015, 
Rapapport Hovav, 2014) 
5 The translation of ‘cut the interest rates’, for instance is not ‘cortar los tipos de interés’ but ‘recortar los 
tipos de interés’. 
6 The proposal has problems, as when the cut is not controlled, as in ‘the rope cut’, or ‘se cortó la cuerda’ 
(Spanish). It is certainly difficult to find necessary conditions rather than prototypical conditions. 
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verbs that has just been mentioned, according to which only VPs, but not verbs taken in 
isolation, have interesting semantic properties. One way of explaining how VPs get 
their meaning properties is to appeal to the interaction between the thin meaning of the 
verb and the rich meaning of its arguments. To use an example from Pustejovsky 
(1995), the difference between bake a cake (create) and bake a potato (warm up) is 
explained as the result of the interaction between the schematic meaning of bake and the 
lexical information provided by the nouns (cakes are artefacts; potatoes are natural 
kinds). Similarly, the fact that the intransitive the rope cut is acceptable (Rappaport 
Hovav, 20147) seems to depend on the rich meaning of rope, and the unacceptability of 
the law broke is explained by virtue of the rich meaning of law. In sum, when the 
arguments of a verb are kind terms, we witness what look like “modulations” of verb 
meanings that can affect their usual grammatical behavior.  
Another argument that supports the view that kind terms and some proper nouns 
(particularly names of cities or of countries)8 may be semantically different to the rest of 
words draws on the nature of kind-concepts in general. As Carey (2009) puts it, kind-
concepts are “inductively deep” (see also Millikan, 2000 on the difference between 
substances and classes). We draw lots of inferences based on our kind-concepts because 
they store lots of information. In contrast, concepts of properties or events are 
informationally “flat” (Millikan, 2000; see also Pritchard, 2017). Actually, it seems that 
common nouns in general behave like attractors of information or nodes of inference. 
Even very young children are prone to generalize and make inferences when the label 
they hear is a common noun, but are much more cautious when the words used are 
adjectives or form descriptions (Fennell & Waxman, 2010). This is related to the 
essentialist stance: kind terms are assumed to denote categories with essences, 
categories which are the “joints” of nature. We store information about these categories 
because they are the ones that allow us to make inferences and generalizations. The 
point, thus, is that a kind term will typically give access to much more information, and 
will relate to a bigger/richer concept, than any other term.    
                                                          
7 See (Rappaport Hovav and Levin, 2014):  
a. . . . the rope cut on the rock releasing Rod on down the mountain. 
(http://www.avalanche-center.org/Incidents/1997-98/19980103a-Montana.php) 
b. The sheath of the rope had cut on the edge of the overhang and slid down 2 
feet. (www.rockclimbing.org/tripreports/elnino.htm) 
c. The rope cut and the climber landed on his feet, stumbled backward and fell 
. . . (http://rockandice.com/articles/how-to-climb/article/1092-rope-choppedby- 
carabiner) 
d. Suddenly, the rope cut and he fell down the well. 
(http://www.englishforfun.bravehost.com/wishingwell.htm) 
8 The case is not limited to names of cities, countries, and similar entities, and the kinds of polysemy we 
have considered so far, though these are particularly illustrative. Many proper nouns enter into different 
patterns of regular polysemies (like the author-for-works-of-author pattern, or location-for-event pattern –
this is a new Vietnam). Moreover, proper nouns of persons can be said to be able to refer to at least two 
different entities: the body and the person, as exemplified by the two different readings of John is very 
flexible, depending on the two different aspects associated to the proper name John (John, as a person, is 
very flexible; John, as a body, is very flexible). Concerning the adjective flexible, I would like to tell a 
story similar to that told about verbs: the specific senses it has in different utterances of John is flexible 
are related to the rich meaning provided by the noun.   
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However, the picture that emerges from what we have seen above seems to jeopardize 
the interesting dichotomy between some nominals and the rest of words, and, what is 
worse, it leads us to an apparent cul-de-sac. Remember that three kinds of polysemies 
have been distinguished: inherent, merely regular, and metaphor-based, irregular 
polysemies. It has been held that the first two kinds suggest an overspecification 
approach, while the third kind favors an underspecification account. The problem is that 
both regular and irregular, metaphor-based, polysemy affect kind-terms, as shown by 
(15a-m). 
(15a) Open your mouth. 
(15b) He has a beautiful mouth.  
(15c) You cannot live without a mouth.  
(15d) Put that into your mouth.  
(15e) I have a pain not in my teeth, but in my mouth.  
(15f) Wonderful words came out of her mouth.  
(15g) Jim has such a big mouth: you cannot trust him. 
(15h) They call him The Mouth of Sauron: he is Sauron’s messenger. 
 (15i) They went as far as to give the family dog mouth to mouth. 
(15j) Storytelling and oral tradition are forms of word of mouth that play important 
roles in folklore.  
(15k) The expedition reached the mouth of the Amazon. 
(15l) She is always putting words in my mouth. 
(15m) In the evenings a large flock of swifts circle the mouth of the cave...9 
(15a-f) are (12a-f) above, and arguably exemplify a polysemy of aspects. (15g-m) are 
metaphorical, but conventionalized, uses of mouth. Each metaphorical sense relates to, 
but does not denote, one of the aspects highlighted in (15a-f). Rather, the metaphorical 
senses look like elaborations of the original (15a-f) aspects.  
According to what has been laid out above, we should acknowledge: (a) that mouth has 
a rich meaning that includes all different aspects/senses highlighted in (15a-f), and (b) 
that mouth has a thin meaning that applies to all its different metaphorical (15g-m) and 
non-metaphorical senses. The tension is self-evident and compromises the neat 
conclusions we suggested in the previous sections, where we established that, while 
regular polysemy requires a rich meanings account, metaphor-based polysemy calls for 
                                                          
9 For more examples of the polysemy of mouth and its cognates in different languages, see Nissen, 2011. 
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an underspecification approach. Such conclusions need to be nuanced, but it is not 
obvious in which way. 
One possibility is to revise what has been said above concerning metaphor-based 
polysemy, and give more credibility to the idea that all senses of a polyseme are stored 
in one single, “super-rich”, representation. However, this approach is not appealing. 
Apart from the reasons considered above against the general case, there are some more 
specific reasons to reject that all senses of a noun can be part of a single representation. 
Examples (15g-m) show that different metaphorical chains relate to different aspects of 
the metonymically generated meaning of mouth. Thus, MOUTH (OF A RIVER) relates to 
the aperture sense/aspect of MOUTH (OF A PERSON), while (BIG)MOUTH relates to its 
speech organ sense. Now, suppose that (BIG)MOUTH primes MOUTH (OF A PERSON), just 
as MOUTH (OF A RIVER) does (MacGregor et al., 2015). The question is whether 
(BIG)MOUTH and MOUTH (OF A RIVER) would also prime each other. The super-rich 
hypothesis requires that they should, because by hypothesis, they belong to the same 
representation.  
To my knowledge, there is no study that could illuminate this precise question. 
However, we may assume that (big)mouth and mouth (of a river) express “distant 
senses” (i.e., they are not closely related by metonymy or similarity), as (shredded) 
paper and (liberal) paper do. Now, what we know about distant senses such as the ones 
expressed by this pair is that they behave more like the meanings of homonymous terms 
(there are clear dominance effects and there is no co-priming, but competition, between 
them). So, it seems reasonable to think that distant senses are stored in different 
representations (Klein and Murphy, 2001, Foraker and Murphy, 2012, Rabagliati and 
Snedekker, 2013). If this is also the case with respect to (BIG)MOUTH and MOUTH (OF A 
RIVER), then the idea that all senses of mouth may belong to a single representation has 
to be wrong. 
Co-priming, as “being close to,” is not a transitive relation. If there is co-priming 
between A and B and between B and C, then it does not need to be the case that there is 
co-priming between A and C. This suggests that there are senses that are more central 
than others. A plausible case is that the most central sense of, e.g., mouth is actually not 
a sense but a collection of senses or aspects. That is, the central meaning of mouth is the 
complex, rich, meaning that we can label MOUTH (OF A PERSON). The different aspects 
of this complex are related to different metaphorical but conventionalized meanings of 
mouth, such that they are able to activate these meanings and be activated by them (an 
activation, which in turn, activates the whole complex). A possibility is that this co-
activation of aspects and metaphorical meanings/senses of nouns takes place via feature 
activation. That is, the features that compound the APERTURE aspect in MOUTH (OF A 
PERSON), in particular, those shared by the sense MOUTH (OF A RIVER), are responsible 
for the activation that goes in both directions; some of the features that compound the 
SPEECH ORGAN sense of mouth are responsible for the co-activation of its meaning and 
of the senses expressed by bigmouth and Mouth of Sauron, etc.  
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The picture that emerges, then, is one where the meaning formed by the different 
aspects of a noun play the role that underspecific representations play in metaphor-
based polysemies generally: i.e. they provide features that channel the activation 
towards metaphorical senses and back. In sum, it can still be maintained that the 
meaning of some nouns is formed by a series of aspects constituting a single 
representation, and thus, that these nouns have a differentially rich meaning.   
5. Conclusion 
There has been somewhat little research on the meaning of lexical words, and, likewise, 
little systematic research on polysemy. There has even be less work on relating both 
these topics, even though it is obvious that they must be related. Polysemy is starting to 
attract some attention in psycholinguistics, but the results we have to date still require a 
lot of discussion and clarification, as well as a better integration with theoretical models. 
In this paper, I scratched the surface of what could be an integrative model of polysemy, 
and of how it could affect our models of word meaning. I am aware that there are some 
loose ends in the picture I have tried to put forward. However, I hope that I was able to 
convince the reader that the overall approach makes sense and is worth pursuing further. 
The approach has it that there is a difference at the level of meaning between kind terms 
(and some proper nouns) and the rest of words. The main argument supporting this 
distinction is that kind terms enter into patterns of polysemy that call for a rich meaning 
approach, while verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions, while massively 
polysemous, are affected only by metaphor-based polysemy, which suggests a thin, 
underspecification approach. Additional support for this view comes from reflections on 
the nature of kind concepts (vs. the rest), as well as by looking at how the interaction 
between the meanings of nouns and the meanings of verbs explains some semantic 
observations. In this regard, I suggest that what meaning or sense a verb or an adjective 
expresses in a given context depends on the information stored in the meaning of its 
argument and on what part or aspect of that information is selected. 
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